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 Executive Summary 
T he Great Recession that began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 was the most severe since the Great Depression. In addition to having one of the steepest declines in employment, the recovery has been among the slowest. Yet, we are in our sixth year of economic expansion, which 
is already the 5th longest since WWII. Although the lengthy expansion has been remarkable given the 
weak recovery, especially in terms of net job growth, we are getting to the point where another downturn 
would not be surprising.  
 
To put the severity of the latest recession in perspective, this policy brief contains a comparison of the 
employment fluctuations to those from previous recessions, beginning with the rather severe one in 1973-
1975. Employment in the U.S. and Ohio indicate the following:  
 
 The latest recession was the most severe for the U.S. since 1973: nonfarm employment declined the 
most and the recovery has been the slowest. As a result, U.S. nonfarm employment did not return to 
its initial level at the onset of the recession until May 2014.  
 National manufacturing employment had the steepest decline of any recent recession, but the recov-
ery fared better than some. It has been recovering steadily since September 2010, albeit very slowly. 
After falling by nearly 17%, manufacturing employment in June 2014 is still 12% below where it was 
at the onset of the recession in December 2007, and 30% below employment in June 2000, indicating 
that despite talk of a manufacturing renaissance, it seems unrelated to job growth.    
 The decline in Ohio’s employment is comparable to previous recessions, largely because it is one of 
the states that suffers the most during economic downturns due to its heavier reliance on manufactur-
ing. However, Ohio’s nonfarm employment has not fully recovered: by August 2014, employment re-
mained 2% below pre-recession levels. Despite Ohio’s initial outperformance of the U.S. during the 
economic expansion beginning in June 2009, sluggish growth allowed the U.S. to surpass Ohio’s rate 
of job growth by 2011.  
 Manufacturing employment in Ohio had a substantial decline at the onset of the recession: employ-
ment plummeted by 20%, or declined by about 150,000 employees, and remained 11% below pre-
recession levels by August 2014. Yet, the above average performance for Ohio during the 2010-2011 
period was in part due to the initial rapid recovery in manufacturing for the U.S. and Ohio. Neverthe-
less, Ohio’s manufacturing employment remained 34% below its levels of June 2000 and 51% below 
the levels of 1979.  
 
Comparing national employment fluctuations alongside Ohio’s can misconstrue its economic perfor-
mance. As a state with a relatively large manufacturing sector, which has more volatile employment fluc-
tuations, Ohio is one of the hardest hit states during recessions, but bounces back a little faster as well. 
Thus, Ohio is more comparable to other Great Lakes states, which also have a large manufacturing sec-
tor, similar settlement histories, and natural amenities. The Great Lakes states’ employment fluctuations 
suggest the following:  
 
 Employment growth in Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois has lagged, particularly compared to the U.S. and 
Wisconsin. From 1969 to 2013, total employment in the three states grew by around 30%; it grew by 
about 50% in Indiana and over 80% in Wisconsin and the U.S.  
 Michigan had a much steeper decline in employment during the latest recession, but recovered more 
quickly than Ohio and Illinois. As a result, by August 2014, all three laggards remain 2% below em-
ployment at the onset of the recession, lower than Indiana, Wisconsin, and the U.S.  
 
Finally, a more detailed examination of Ohio is conducted. Employment changes in the three most popu-
lous metropolitan cities, Columbus, Cleveland, and Cincinnati, greatly impact the state. Analyzing these 
three metropolitan areas indicate the following:  
 
 Although the recent recession was challenging for all three metropolitan areas, Columbus clearly per-
formed the best: it fully recovered by February 2012, whereas neither Cincinnati nor Cleveland has 
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fully recovered as of August 2014. 
 Even compared to their peer U.S. metropolitan areas, Columbus performed the best, with the lowest 
decline in employment and the fastest recovery. Conversely, employment in Cincinnati had one of the 
steepest declines and the slowest recovery after Cleveland.  
 
The economic performance of cities and states is often attributed to the state government’s policies. How-
ever, it remains unclear how these policies truly affect a state’s economy, something that voters must be 
conscious of before commending or reprimanding these public officials. In conjunction with government 
policies, numerous factors lead to economic fluctuations, particularly over the last few decades as we’ve 
become more globalized. Since the middle part of the past decade, Ohio state policymakers have relied 
on tax policy to attract new economic activity. Although Ohio continues to slowly recover from the latest 
recession, employment has become relatively stagnant over these last few months while national employ-
ment has continued its rapid recovery. This slow recovery may be partially due to other states adopting 
similar tax cutting policies, meaning Ohio and other states are treading water. Instead, alternative strate-





T he most recent recession, dubbed the Great Recession, was the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression; it began in December 2007 and lasted until June 2009. Historically, reces-sions were severe, but the economy recovered quickly. The economic downturn for the 1990-91 
and 2001 recessions was not very deep but followed by anemic economic growth, similar to the recovery 
from the Great Recession. Oftentimes, jobs are permanently destroyed and employment does not fully 
recover, becoming known as “jobless” recoveries (e.g. Avent 2012; Tankersley 2013). As the economy 
struggled to recover from the latest recession, the media lamented over the plight of the long-term unem-
ployed (e.g. Perkins 2014). Additionally, a number of studies analyzed the slow recovery and made pre-
dictions about how the economy may look in the future (e.g. Schierholz and Bivens 2010), including a re-
port released by the C. William Swank program. 
 
In November 2009, the Swank program released a report forecasting how the economic recovery might 
take shape (Partridge, Huang, and Uprety 2009). Using a similar methodology, this study compares the 
recent economic recovery to those following previous recessions.  
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Beginning with the 1973 recession, changes in employment are examined for every recession, as 
classified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the official arbiter of these dates: 1973-
1975, 1980, 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 2001, and the latest from 2007-20091. The relative performance of 
the economy is measured using employment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, beginning with the first month the economy officially went into recession, as declared 
by NBER. The figures report relative employment for the next 84 months, benchmarked to employment at 
the onset of the recession, or the peak employment of the economic expansion. Thus, the trend lines in 
the figures begin at 100. When it is at 90, employment is 10% below employment at the peak, and if the 
trend line is at 115, employment is 15% above the peak. 
 
Employment is a better measure of economic performance than unemployment or income for several 
reasons. The unemployment rate is calculated using individuals “actively” seeking employment, ignoring 
discouraged workers and those whose efforts are viewed as “inactive.” It also misses the fluid nature of 
people jumping in and out of the labor market. Furthermore, at the state and local level, unemployment 
rates do not reflect people who move away for better economic opportunities. The nonfarm employment 
estimate comes from a larger, much more representative survey of employers; it is eventually 
benchmarked to tax return records that make it extremely accurate after a few years. It has none of the 
disadvantages of unemployment rate, and ultimately job growth is generally considered a good thing while 
changes in the unemployment rate are associated with “good” or “bad” reasons (Partridge and Rickman, 
2003a). 
 
Measures of income are problematic as well. Although average income may grow in a jobless recovery, it 
may be a skewed representation if the income growth is generated by the very top of the distribution while 
those below are not participating in the recovery.2 Furthermore, data on income tends to be released later, 
sometimes up to 18 months for local areas. Finally, the public is focused on job creation, further making 
the case that jobs should be the metric we use. Thus, following our policy briefs for the last eight years, 
the analyses conducted in this study use employment growth to compare the economic recovery from the 
most recent recession to previous ones. 
1
Throughout this paper, employment refers to nonfarm employment, unless specified otherwise.  
2
The growth in median household income may capture what is happening at the middle of the distribution, but this number is not as 
widely available as the other alternatives. Likewise, the employment/population ratio is a preferred measure of employment condi-
tions than the unemployment rate because it is not affected by definitions of who is in the active labor force, but it is not well under-
stood by the public. Unemployment rate estimates are also greatly influenced by measurement error at the state and local level. 
 
The layout of this policy brief begins with a broader national outlook of the recovery and tapers down to a 
citywide analysis. The following section analyzes the national recovery. Section 3 examines employment 
in Ohio, which is then compared to other Great Lakes States in Section 4. Section 5 compares the eco-
nomic performance of metropolitan cities, which is followed by a discussion of the role of state government 




 National Recovery 
The Great Recession is considered to be one of the worst economic downturns since the Great Depres-
sion. Previously, the 1981-82 recession had been the most severe, largely because there was insufficient 
time to recover from the one in 1980; it became known as a “double dip” recession. Nonetheless, it had a 
smaller decline in employment and a faster recovery than the latest recession. After the early 1980s, em-
ployment changes caused by fluctuations in the business cycle have been less volatile, which has been 
partially attributed to the declining share of manufacturing in total employment (e.g. Warnock and 
Warnock 2000), which was labeled by economists as the Great Moderation. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the latest recession had the largest decline in national employment. Prior to the 
2007-09 recession, the 3% decline in employment during the 1981-82 recession had been the deepest 
since 1973. The Great Recession had a decline that was twice as deep: by the 27th month, employment 
had fallen by about 6%, or over 8 million employees. In addition to having the most severe decline in em-
ployment, the latest recession had one of the slowest recoveries.  
 
The sluggish recovery beginning in June 2009 delayed the full restoration of U.S. employment for 78 
months after the onset of the recession, or until May 2014. It was the longest recovery compared to re-
cent recessions. While it took almost five years for employment to fully recover from this last recession, it 
took 25, 28, 31, and 46 months, respectively, for total employment to fully recover from the 1973-75, 1981
-82, 1990-91, and 2001 recessions. Recovery from the 2001 recession is deceptively slow near the end of 
the trend line because the Great Recession began at the 81st month. Furthermore, recoveries from the 
relatively severe 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions had already experienced about 15% job growth from 
their pre-recession peaks when they reached the stage we are currently in with the Great Recession. 
Nevertheless, national employment has been steadily increasing since September 2010, albeit very slow-
ly. 
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Economists often refer to the 1982-2007 period as the “Great Moderation”, during which the business cy-
cle was much more muted and employment fluctuations were much less volatile. As previously mentioned, 
this was partially attributed to the declining share of manufacturing in total employment. Figure 2 shows 
that national manufacturing employment never fully recovered from the recent recessions. The burst of the 
dot com bubble in 2001 had the worst recovery, even after considering that the end of this trend line in-
cludes the beginning of the Great Recession. Manufacturing employment plummeted in the latest reces-
sion, falling by nearly 17%. Although the recovery has been better than the one following the 2001 reces-
sion, it remains nearly 12% below employment at the onset of the recession in December 2007, and 30% 
below employment in June 2000, nine years before the Great Recession ended.  
 
Recovery for the manufacturing sector has been much slower than it has been for the broader economy. 
While there have been optimistic predictions of a manufacturing rebirth, it is hard to see if employment will 
be a major component (Schwartz, 2014). U.S. manufacturing has experienced rather large productivity 
increases since World War II. As a result, while the manufacturing share of GDP has not declined signifi-
cantly, employment has fallen at about the rate of productivity growth (Marquis and Trehan, 2010). Figure 
3 illustrates this phenomena from 1979 to 2013 using annual data, and for 2014, using the average growth 
through September 2014. Like the previous graphs, 1979 has been benchmarked to 100. Industrial pro-
duction for manufacturing from the Federal Reserve Board represents output. As the figure shows, while 
manufacturing production has grown throughout most of the period, employment has fallen. Since the be-
ginning of the Great Recession, production has barely recovered its pre-recession peak, making it difficult 
to see a rebirth of the manufacturing sector in the data.  
 
This decline in manufacturing as a share of employment partially explains why the recovery process has 
been steadily slowing – manufacturing typically rebounds fairly quickly.3 However, because of the deep 
decline in employment during the Great Recession, the slow recovery has been painful. It also raises the 




The recovery from the 1980 recession is deceptively lower because of the double dip recession in 1981-82, and thus ignored for the pur-




 Ohio’s Recovery 
Although national employment has fully recovered, Ohio’s employment has not: it remains about 2% be-
low employment at the onset of the recession. By February 2010, 26 months after the recession began, 
employment reached its lowest point at about 419,000 fewer employees. However, because Ohio is one 
of the states that suffers the most during recessions due to its manufacturing intensity, Figure 4 shows 
that the decline in employment in this last recession is comparable to previous ones, particularly the 
“double-dip” recession in the early 1980s.  
 
The recovery has been significantly worse in the last two economic downturns. The 2001 recession had a 
stagnant recovery, where employment remained about 2% to 3% below employment in March 2001 until 
the onset of the Great Recession, when it declined further. Ohio’s employment improved at a faster rate 
than it did after the 2001 recession, especially in the 2010-2011 period. Nevertheless, it was slower than 
any other recession depicted in Figure 4. Furthermore, because of the steep decline, employment re-
mains about 2% below its initial level in December 2007. At this stage of the recovery from the severe 
1981-82 recession and the relatively mild 1990-91 recession, employment had already increased by 
about 10%. Furthermore, employment has recovered much more slowly for Ohio than it did for the nation. 
 
A.  Comparing Ohio’s Nonfarm Employment to the U.S. 
Although national employment had fully recovered by June 2014, Ohio’s remains about 2% below em-
ployment in December 2007. Both the U.S. and Ohio reached its lowest employment in February 2010, or 
27 months after the onset of the recession. Ohio had a slightly steeper decline at almost 8%, whereas the 
U.S. declined by a little over 6%. However, the U.S. had a faster recovery, despite Ohio’s initial outperfor-
mance in 2010.  
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Figure 5 compares Ohio’s job growth to the nation’s during the current economic expansion, which began 
in 2009. Initially, Ohio outperformed the U.S. in the recovery process; its employment increased more 
quickly in 2010. The following year, employment for both increased by 1.6%. Subsequently, national em-
ployment continued to increase at a slightly quickening rate while Ohio’s employment growth slowed, lead-
ing to a greater disparity in the percentage change in employment. Ohio’s employment increased by only 
1% and 0.3%, respectively, in 2013 and 2014. Meanwhile, national employment increased at a rate of 
1.9% thus far in 2014. This shows that after the initial bounce back, Ohio has settled into its historic posi-
tion dating back to the late 1960s of lagging behind U.S. employment growth by about one-half to one per-
centage point each year. 
 
B.  Ohio’s Manufacturing Sector 
Historically, Ohio has been one of the states that suffers the most during economic downturns, largely be-
cause of its prominent manufacturing sector. Due to volatile demand, manufacturing employees are gener-
ally the hardest hit when the economy is struggling. Figure 6a shows that Ohio experienced a precipitous 
decline in manufacturing employment, which plummeted at the onset of the recession.4 It declined by 
nearly 150,000 employees (20%) by June 2009, or 19 months after the recession began; by June 2014, it 
recovered by almost 10%.  
 
Despite Ohio’s seemingly faster recovery compared to previous recessions, the trend is slightly skewed 
because Ohio had a worse recovery after the 2001 recession. Manufacturing employment never recov-
ered in Ohio; when the Great Recession began, it was about 23% below its initial level in March 2001. The 
volatility of manufacturing employment has a greater impact on Ohio’s economy than the nation’s because 
it makes up a greater portion of total employment. Yet, it is remarkable that, aside from the one in 1990-
91, every recession dating back to 1973 has left Ohio’s manufacturing employment at least 5% below its 
initial level by the 84th month.  
 
The long-term trend has been a loss in manufacturing employment caused by recessions that never en-
tirely recover in the subsequent recovery. Figure 6a shows that manufacturing employment in Ohio never 
fully recovered, even after seven years. As a result, at the onset of the 2007 recession, manufacturing em-
ployment was about 45% and 26%, respectively, below the level in 1979 and June 2000. Although it con-
tinued to recover, this left Ohio’s manufacturing employment in June 2014 to be about 51% and 34%, re-
spectively, below its level in 1979 and June 2000. As noted above, much of this is due to rapid productivity 
growth. Manufacturing output has continued to increase despite the decline in employment, raising the 
question of how Ohio is going to replace these relatively high-paying jobs.  
9 
4
The notes to Figure 5a and 5b show that we use BEA data before 1990 and BLS data afterwards due to data availability. The 
BEA data includes proprietors and self-employed while the BLS data includes only nonfarm wage and salary employees. As a 
result, because a smaller share of manufacturing employment is made up of proprietors and the self-employed, the BEA data mod-
estly understates the manufacturing share of employment compared to the BLS data.  
Figure 6b illustrates the general grind on manufacturing employment as it becomes relatively smaller. His-
torically, Ohio has had a greater share of manufacturing employees than the U.S. In 1972, 29% of Ohio’s 
employees were in manufacturing, compared to 21% of national employees. The larger share in Ohio has 
been consistent up to 2012, but there has been a clear trend towards deindustrialization in both the U.S. 
and Ohio. The proportion of employees in the manufacturing sector has been declining, countering hopes 
for a “manufacturing renaissance” in terms of employment. The percentage of manufacturing employees in 
Ohio dropped by nearly 20 percentage points over 40 years, reaching 10% in 2012. Despite this dramatic 
decline, the share of employees in manufacturing remains greater than the U.S. share, indicating that fluc-
tuations in Ohio’s employment are not directly comparable to changes in national employment. As noted 
above, Ohio’s employment is more volatile and any improvement in its relative performance will likely re-
quire other industries to lead the way, as manufacturing did for Ohio during the prosperous late 19th Centu-
ry, up through the 1960s. To assess its performance with an appropriate peer group, Ohio is compared to 




 How Does Ohio Compare to Other 
Great Lakes States? 
Historically, Great Lakes states have had a large proportion of employees in the manufacturing sector, 
which partially explains why the region exhibits more volatile employment fluctuations during economic 
cycles. However, this regional disparity has shrunk in recent decades. A possible explanation is the de-
cline in manufacturing, which has created a more uniform labor market across the U.S. (Partridge and 
Rickman 2002). Although this decline reduced the volatility of employment fluctuations, a smaller manu-
facturing sector in terms of employment share may have also contributed to the lagging overall employ-
ment growth that Great Lakes states have experienced over the last few decades. 
 
Figure 7 reports annual employment dating back to 1969 for the five Great Lakes states and the U.S. As 
shown in the graph, employment growth in most of these states has lagged. Wisconsin is the only state 
that has resembled the national employment trend; the remaining states have performed much worse 
over the years. By 2013, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio had the lowest levels of employment growth at 
around 30% over the 44 year period. Employment in Indiana grew by 56%, and in Wisconsin and the 
U.S., it grew by around 80%. Although the disparity in economic growth started in the 1970s, it accelerat-
ed after 1979; the most recent economic recovery further widened the gap.  
 
Figure 8 drills down to the relative performance of the Great Lakes states since the beginning of the Great 
Recession. Mirroring the employment trends depicted in Figure 7, Wisconsin’s employment fluctuations 
have followed the nation’s. Although Illinois’s initial economic downturn also resembled the nation’s, its 
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recovery has been slower than the rest of the region. Conversely, Indiana had a deeper decline in employ-
ment but recovered more quickly, resembling the resurgence in Wisconsin and the U.S. by June 2010. 
Michigan clearly suffered the worst: by July 2009, employment had declined by nearly 10%, the lowest 
across the Great Lakes states. However, it experienced a more rapid recovery than Ohio and Illinois be-
ginning in April 2010. As a result, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio have had the weakest recovery: by June 
2014, they remained 2% below employment at the onset of the recession. Yet, Michigan’s relative employ-
ment growth has matched the national average since the Great Recession ended. Given all of the structur-
al problems in Michigan, its performance is the most impressive in the region and it will be interesting to 
see if that pattern continues.5  
12 
5
Both Indiana and Michigan recently became right-to-work states. It will be interesting to monitor what effect this union-working 
policy has on their performance. 
 
 
 How Did Ohio’s Cities Fare? 
Employment changes in Ohio are largely driven by the three most populous metropolitan areas: Cincin-
nati, Cleveland, and Columbus; thus, we will focus on their performance.6 Yet their relatively divergent 
economic fortunes over the last few decades illustrates that an “average” Ohio story is somewhat mis-
leading. Although Columbus has performed relatively well, Cincinnati and Cleveland suffered greatly dur-
ing this last recession.7 
 
By February 2012, 51 months after the onset of the recession, employment had fully recovered in Colum-
bus. However, neither Cincinnati nor Cleveland had fully recovered by June 2014: employment remained 
about 1% and 3%, respectively, below employment in December 2007. This was largely the result of both 
cities having a more severe decline in employment and a slower recovery. Employment in Cleveland was 
further hampered by its inability to fully recover from the 2001 recession. Nevertheless, due to the severity 
of the Great Recession, even employment in the Columbus metropolitan area was only 4% above its ini-
tial level at the onset of the Great Recession in December 2007. In fact, the 2001 Recession and the 
Great Recession had the slowest recoveries for all three metropolitan areas. 
 
Across all three metropolitan areas, Figure 9, 10, and 11 show that the latest recession had the most se-
vere decline in employment.8 However, Cleveland and Columbus recovered faster than it did for the 2001 
recession, even after excluding the months following the 81st month when the Great Recession began. In 
Columbus, this was the result of a recovery that started sooner and occurred more rapidly. However, in 
Cleveland, this was largely the result of a stagnant recovery from the 2001 recession. At the start of the 
Great Recession in December 2007, Cleveland’s employment remained around 5% below its employment 
of March 2001. Despite the seemingly improved economy, as of June 2014, Cleveland metropolitan area 
employment remained around 1,039,000 employees, which is lower than any month following the 2001 
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6
Figure 16 and 17 in the Appendix shows nonfarm and manufacturing employment for additional metropolitan areas, specifically 
Akron, Canton, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown. Figure 18 in the Appendix illustrates nonfarm and manufacturing employment 
alongside each other for Akron, Canton, and Youngstown.  
7
In this discussion, we are referring to the entire metropolitan area and not just the principal cities Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Colum-
bus.  
8
Figure 14 and 15 in the Appendix show the employment trend in nonfarm employment and manufacturing employment for all three 
metropolitan areas alongside each other, in addition to the U.S. 
14 
recession and the lowest since September 1994, when the Great Recession months are ignored. A large 
contributor is Cleveland’s consistently slower employment growth following recessions; Columbus general-
ly performs the best in the recovery process, followed by Cincinnati. These differences across cities are 
driven partly by differences in the share of employment in manufacturing.  
 
Historically, Cleveland was known for its manufacturing sector, particularly for automobiles and heavy 
manufacturing. Second only to Detroit, Cleveland became one of the largest centers for the automotive 
industry in the 1910s and the 1920s (Stapleton 1997). Despite the overall decline in manufacturing, the 
sector continues to dominate in Cleveland. Figure 12 shows that Cleveland and Columbus, respectively, 
have had the highest and lowest share of manufacturing employment since 1972.9 The larger service 
economy in Columbus has kept Central Ohio from being as exposed to global competition and the down-
sizing in manufacturing due to productivity growth, sparing it from the substantial decline during severe 
economic downturns that Cleveland suffers from. Nevertheless, all three cities have succumbed to the 
deindustrialization that has occurred across the nation. From 1972 to 2012, the share of manufacturing 
employment declined by about one-third in Cincinnati and Cleveland. In 2012, the share had dropped be-
low 10% in Cincinnati and Columbus; Cleveland remained the highest at 10%.  
 
A. A Comparison to Their Peers  
Given the higher manufacturing shares in Cincinnati and Cleveland, it is not surprising that Columbus has 
outperformed them since the Great Recession. Thus, we form another peer group of metropolitan areas 
with about 2 million people and economies that are more service dominated like Columbus. Doing so pro-
vides a better perspective of how well Columbus has actually performed.  
 
Even compared to peer metropolitan areas, Columbus has clearly performed the best since the onset of 
the Great Recession: it had one of the lowest declines in employment and the fastest recovery. Figure 13 
shows that Columbus recovered faster than any of the comparable metropolitan areas, with employment 
fully recovering by February 2012. Conversely, Cincinnati performed the worst, having one of the steepest 
declines in employment, along with Cleveland and Charlotte, NC. While Charlotte recovered quickly, Cin-
cinnati had the slowest recovery after Cleveland. However, Cincinnati is not as comparable to these peer 
metropolitan areas as Columbus, and judging Cleveland’s performance according to these areas is unfair. 
A manufacturing intensive city, such as Detroit or St. Louis, would be more comparable to Cleveland. 
Overall, Columbus, Indianapolis, and Charlotte are the most impressive at the moment. Yet, it is concern-
ing employment has become relatively stagnant in Columbus, whereas Indianapolis and Charlotte have 
15 
9
Due to data availability, we use BEA data for the metropolitan area manufacturing employment. As described in footnote 4, BEA 
data likely (slightly) understates the manufacturing share of wage and salary employment because it includes proprietors and self-
employed.  
continued to mostly grow over these last few months. Nevertheless, this figure illustrates that Columbus 
has performed relatively well, despite the fact that Ohio as a whole had not recovered by June 2014, high-




 Role of the State Government 
As cities and towns across the nation struggle to recover from the Great Recession, the role of govern-
ment in restoring economic growth is often raised, particularly for governors and state legislatures. When 
the economy is performing well or improving, state governments are commended for their policies that 
spurred this growth, and criticized when their economies are struggling. For the most part, state policies 
have a limited effect on their states because of the greater importance of national and global trends. Yet, 
state policies do matter, but even here, it takes time for their effect to be realized as expectations need to 
change, workers need to migrate, and businesses and entrepreneurs need to make tangible investments. 
It takes at least five years, usually closer to ten years, to identify a change in trends, as discussed further 
below. 
 
In Ohio, in preparation for the upcoming gubernatorial elections, the Columbus Dispatch conducted a poll 
and found that the majority believed the economy was improving (Rowland 2014). Those who were inter-
viewed stated that they intended to reelect Governor Kasich, attributing the economy’s improvement to 
“Kasich’s policies on taxes” and his attempts to “lower taxes, broaden revenue streams, and cut govern-
ment spending.” As mentioned earlier, voters oftentimes are unaware if there will be long-term changes 
from the policies due to the number of years that must elapse, but they can hopefully sense what is work-
ing from their everyday experiences. 
 
Conversely, when the economy is performing poorly, state governments are often reprimanded for their 
policies by being unseated in the following election. In Iowa, Governor Culver was unseated in the 2010 
election as the state struggled over its budget cuts and his handling of the state budget, particularly his 
moviemaking tax credit program (Beaumont 2009). As noted by Jacobson (2012), an incumbent governor 
rarely loses a reelection, but a struggling economy is one of the main reasons it happens, particularly if 
the incumbent is unable portray how the problem is being addressed. 
 
Despite the importance of a state’s economic performance in gubernatorial elections, it is unclear how 
much the governor and state policies actually affect the state’s economy. A recent study by Blinder and 
Watson (2014) found that the national economy grew faster when a Democrat was president, but the rea-
son for this partisan gap seems to be the result of good luck, rather than good policy. Although state poli-
cies such as the 2005 Ohio tax cuts, are intended to spur economic growth, limited research has exam-
ined their true effects. Furthermore, it is difficult to correctly assess a legislation’s effect until many years 
thereafter, in addition to the complexities of ensuring a state policy is not accredited for the economic per-
formance when it may actually be caused by other factors. Thus, voters must use their discretion before 
commending or reprimanding governors for the economic performance of their state. Yet, the data is quite 
clear in the case of Ohio. The state’s job growth is about the same as it has been since the late 1960s. If 
the state wants to change that trend, it will take a litany of good luck and good policy. In particular, the 
state may need to do a better job of differentiating itself from other states, almost all of whom have adopt-
ed fairly similar tax-cutting strategies.  
 
One area that has been popular in many policy circles is taking advantage of a relatively slack labor mar-
ket and historically low interest rates to rebuild and enhance the state’s infrastructure (IMF, 2014). Infra-
structure development has the short-term effect of stimulating demand and the long-term of advantage of 
enhancing productivity growth and living standards. Given the potential advantages, we urge considera-
tion of such efforts as a way to boost long-term performance.  
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While it is sensible to blame or praise policymakers for a state’s economic performance, doing so does 
not guarantee future economic success. There are a myriad of other factors that must be accounted for 
and the ability to see the true effects of policy takes time. For Ohioans, comparing employment in Colum-
bus, Cleveland, and Cincinnati bears good and bad news for Ohio’s recovery from the Great Recession. 
Columbus recovered more quickly than the U.S., with employment fully recovering by February 2012. 
Conversely, excluding Cleveland, Cincinnati had a slower recovery than any peer metropolitan city includ-
ed in Figure 13. The speed of recovery for these three cities coincides with the share of employees in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
Compared to other historically manufacturing states, Ohio was among the states with the slowest recov-
ery and the steepest decline in employment. As a result, Ohio still has yet to fully recover from the Great 
Recession in terms of employment, raising questions on how to spur economic growth for the state. Ra-
ther than being whimsical of a past economy and hoping for a “manufacturing renaissance”, efforts to in-
duce economic growth should focus on transitioning to different sectors and encourage home-bred efforts 
to create businesses, particularly for Cleveland. Even doing so, however, does not guarantee future eco-
nomic growth.  
 
Although national employment fully recovered by May 2014, the severity of the Great Recession and the 
anemic “jobless” recovery may be indicators that the structure of our economy is changing. Technological 
advancements have eased labor requirements and created a worldwide labor market. Bivens and Shier-
holz (2014) suggest that the reason for long-term unemployment stems from a lack of job openings rather 
than a labor force that is unemployable, returning to the age-old question of which aspect of the economy 
stimulates economic growth: jobs created by businesses or the labor force (e.g. Partridge and Rickman 
2003b). Policymakers oftentimes focus on one aspect and attribute any success to their efforts (e.g. Bai 
2012). As the lengthy economic expansion makes a subsequent recession more likely, the severity of the 
Great Recession demonstrates the importance of assessing how the labor market and overall economy 
have changed to determine how to stabilize the economy in future economic downturns.  
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